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  OPINION 
_____________________  
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
 In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform 
Act, a measure which profoundly “revise[d] the old 
sentencing process.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 367 (1989).  One of the reforms effected by the Act 
was the elimination of special parole and the 
establishment of a “new system of supervised release.”  
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 397 
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(1991).  The “new system” was codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583, and included a provision at subsection (g) which 
mandates the revocation of supervised release and the 
imposition of a term of imprisonment under certain 
enumerated circumstances.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).
1
   
The question we consider is: once § 3583(g)’s 
mandatory revocation provision is triggered, what guides 
a district court’s exercise of discretion in determining the 
length of the defendant’s term of imprisonment?  We 
conclude that this exercise of discretion is guided by the 
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
I. 
 In 2002, Theresa Thornhill pled guilty to a single 
count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a) in 
the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania.  On May 23, 2003, the District Court 
sentenced Thornhill to, inter alia, 21 months of 
imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.  
                                                 
1
 Section 3583(g) provides, in relevant part, that if the 
defendant engages in certain conduct involving 
controlled substances or firearms, that “the court shall 
revoke the term of supervised release and require the 
defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed 
the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under 
subsection (e)(3).”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). 
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She was also directed to make restitution in the amount 
of $25,521.12 (2003 Conviction). 
 Thornhill’s five-year term of supervised release for 
the 2003 Conviction commenced on December 30, 2004.  
In a Petition on Supervised Release dated May 30, 2007 
(First Petition), Thornhill’s probation officer advised the 
District Court that: Thornhill had submitted six urine 
samples that tested positive for marijuana; she had failed 
to attend her outpatient treatment for substance abuse;  
she had neither reported to her probation officer nor filed 
the requisite reports; and she had not made any payments 
toward restitution.   
 The District Court issued a bench warrant, and 
Thornhill was arrested in July 2007.  Thereafter, the 
probation officer filed a Motion to Supplement the 
Petition on Supervised Release (Second Petition), 
alleging additional violations of the conditions of her 
supervised release.  The Second Petition charged that 
Thornhill had engaged in fraudulent conduct by opening 
four bank accounts at four different branches of National 
City Bank using four different Social Security numbers. 
It alleged that she had deposited checks drawn on closed 
accounts into these new accounts, and concluded that this 
conduct amounted to bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(1), fraudulent use of social security numbers 
under 18 U.S.C. § 407(a)(7)(B), and aggravated identity 
theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).  Exhibits attached 
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to the Second Petition established that National City 
Bank sustained a loss of $7,648.65.   
On November 16, 2007, Thornhill waived her right 
to an indictment and pled guilty to a one-count 
information charging her with bank fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) (2007 Conviction).  The information 
was based on the criminal conduct described in the 
Second Petition.   
At her guilty plea, Thornhill’s defense counsel 
advised the District Court that, according to the pretrial 
services office, Thornhill was cooperating with the 
conditions of her release.  Specifically, counsel told the 
court that she was reporting to her probation officer as 
required and that her weekly drug screens tested 
negative.  In addition, defense counsel noted that the 
supervising probation officer hoped that Thornhill could 
move out of the residence of a third-party custodian, and 
was agreeable to eliminating the electronic monitoring 
that had been a condition of her pre-trial release.  The 
probation officer confirmed counsel’s representations.  
The District Court agreed to the modifications.   
On February 25, 2008, Thornhill’s probation 
officer filed a Supplemental Petition on Supervised 
Release (Third Petition).  This new petition alleged that 
Thornhill had again tested positive for marijuana on three 
occasions in January and February of 2008, thereby 
violating conditions of supervised release stemming from 
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her 2003 Conviction.  The Third Petition also referenced 
Thornhill’s guilty plea to the 2007 information, which 
established the commission of a federal crime. 
On March 28, 2008, the District Court conducted 
both a sentencing hearing for the 2007 Conviction and a 
hearing on the First, Second, and Third Petitions, which 
alleged violations of the terms of her supervised release 
on the 2003 Conviction.  Defense counsel offered several 
exhibits intended to provide insight into Thornhill’s 
personal circumstances, including a fourteen page, 
single-spaced report from clinical psychologist Jolie S. 
Brams, Ph.D.   
Dr. Brams’s report was thorough.  She noted that, 
contrary to an earlier presentence report, Thornhill had a 
significant history of psychiatric issues as a child.  This 
history included hospitalizations, and noted “a complete 
lack of parental concern or nurturing.”  The report also 
described a history of sexual abuse at the hands of a 
family member which had resulted in her placement into 
foster care.  Thornhill’s marriage was similarly marked 
by physical and mental abuse.  Dr. Brams opined that 
Thornhill had many of the signs and symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder and that her “mental health 
difficulties impacted her ability to deal with her life in a 
consistently efficacious manner, cloud[ed] her judgment, 
and made her more vulnerable to [the] manipulations of 
her husband.”  Dr. Brams described at length the impact 
of the domestic violence Thornhill experienced and 
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characterized her extended family situation as “toxic.”  
The report highlighted the limited resources available to 
help Thornhill.   
According to Dr. Brams, Thornhill had some 
insight into her predicament, and she opined that there 
could be a “good prognostic outcome if the correct 
resources are put in place.”  The report concluded by 
stating: 
Appropriate psychiatric treatment is also 
crucial, and she has demonstrated a 
willingness to comply and recognizes her 
need for these services.  She clearly wants to 
have a “normal” life, but has had little 
opportunity to learn how to create one.  
However, underneath a history of 
dysfunction appears to be a young woman 
who has the potential to change.  
Defense counsel also provided the District Court 
with a six page, single-spaced supplemental report from 
Dr. Brams.  The supplemental report discussed 
Thornhill’s progress over the previous six months.  Dr. 
Brams opined that  
Thornhill’s life is as stable as it likely has 
ever been, and while she recognizes the 
support of her probation officer, attorney, 
and counselor, in reality it is Ms. Thornhill 
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who has generally dealt in an appropriate 
manner with her life, as an adult, parent, 
employee, and citizen.  It is important for 
the Court to note that she has done so in the 
face of continuing stressors, and immense 
family dysfunction with purposeful threats 
to her emotional and physical safety by 
various family members. 
The supplemental report advised that Thornhill was 
employed part time as a licensed nursing assistant.  
According to Dr. Brams, Thornhill was receiving 
counseling services and complying with her medication 
regime.   
Thornhill’s family continued to present obstacles 
for her, especially those created by her abusive husband.  
Dr. Brams noted that Thornhill was concerned about who 
would care for her children if she were to be incarcerated.  
And Thornhill expressed a belief that the progress she 
had made would be negated if she were to be 
incarcerated.  Dr. Brams opined that Thornhill “has done 
well during the last few months,” making “solid and 
positive recovery from many traumatic events.”   
Beyond her written reports, Dr. Brams testified at 
the hearing.  She acknowledged that Thornhill had used 
marijuana, but noted that it was on a therapeutic basis 
when she had run out of her medication and when she 
“was under a great deal of stress.”  According to Dr. 
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Brams, Thornhill did not use marijuana “for recreational 
purposes.”  Thornhill’s probation officer also testified 
about her progress following the 2007 Conviction.   
After hearing the testimony, the District Court 
imposed sentence.  Looking at a guideline range for bank 
fraud of eight to fourteen months of imprisonment, the 
Court granted a substantial downward variance based on 
Thornhill’s diminished mental capacity and her 
responsibility for raising her two sons.  He sentenced her 
to one day of imprisonment, imposed a five-year term of 
supervised release, and directed that she pay restitution to 
National City Bank.   
The hearing then turned to the violations alleged in 
the First, Second, and Third Petitions.  Thornhill 
admitted the allegations in the petitions, and the 
government encouraged the judge to impose a within-
guideline sentence of twelve to eighteen months of 
imprisonment.  Nevertheless, after revoking her 
supervised release on the 2003 Conviction, the District 
Court sentenced her to one day of imprisonment, to be 
served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the 
2007 Conviction.  Importantly, the Court imposed 
another three-year term of supervised release for the 
2003 Conviction.   
The terms of the supervised release imposed for 
the 2007 Conviction included a nine-month period of 
home detention during which Thornhill was required to 
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wear an electronic monitoring device.  In September 
2008, almost six months after being sentenced, Thornhill 
was the subject of yet another Petition on Supervised 
Release (Fourth Petition), this one alleging that she had 
tampered with her electronic monitoring transmitter.
2
  In 
addition, the Fourth Petition alleged that Thornhill had 
again tested positive several times for marijuana.   
A Supplemental Petition on Supervised Release 
(Fifth Petition) followed just a month later.  This Petition 
alleged that Thornhill had failed: to attend scheduled 
mental health appointments; to attend scheduled visits 
with her probation officer; to file the reports that were 
required by the terms of her supervised release; and to 
make any payments toward restitution.   
On October 28, 2008, yet another revocation 
hearing was conducted before the same District Judge.  
Thornhill admitted to using marijuana and that she had 
not been wearing the monitoring device as required.  She 
also admitted to the violations set forth in the Fifth 
Petition.  Once again, the judge found that Thornhill had 
violated the conditions of supervised release and revoked 
her supervised release on both the 2003 and the 2007 
Convictions.  He imposed a within-guideline term of 
imprisonment of nine months on each conviction, to be 
                                                 
2
 According to the Fourth Petition, police officers were at 
her apartment and found her ten-year-old son wearing the 
electronic monitoring transmitter.  A246. 
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served concurrently, followed by a 24-month term of 
supervised release.   
The allegations in the Fourth and Fifth Petitions 
did not include averments that Thornhill had engaged in 
additional criminal conduct.  But an indictment returned 
by a grand jury in May 2009, alleged that from “May 
2008 to in or around July 2008,” Thornhill again 
“knowingly execute[d] and attempt[ed] to execute a 
scheme and artifice to defraud” another bank in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.  On October 9, 2009 the same 
District Judge who had sentenced Thornhill on her 2003 
and 2007 Convictions for bank fraud, accepted 
Thornhill’s guilty plea to the offense of bank fraud (2009 
Conviction).  In February of 2010, he sentenced 
Thornhill to a term of imprisonment of 24 months, 
followed by a four-year term of supervised release and 
payment of restitution.   
Thornhill’s term of supervised release on the 2003, 
2007, and 2009 Convictions commenced on July 27, 
2011.
3
  In a Show Cause Petition (Sixth Petition) dated 
April 26, 2013, Thornhill’s probation officer alleged that 
Thornhill had again violated the terms of her supervised 
                                                 
3
 It appears that Thornhill was sentenced to 24 months of 
imprisonment in February of 2010 and that only 
seventeen months passed when her supervised release 
commenced on July 11, 2011.  The record, however, does 
not explain why she did not serve the entire 24 months.   
12 
 
release for each conviction.  The Sixth Petition alleged 
that: she had committed several violations of 
Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code and Criminal Code; tested 
positive for marijuana on seven occasions;
4
 failed to 
attend mental health treatment appointments; and neither 
reported to the probation office for drug testing as 
required nor submitted the required monthly report.  In 
addition, the Sixth Petition averred that Thornhill had 
made no restitution payments on the 2007 and 2009 
Convictions and owed more than $25,000 on the 2003 
Conviction. 
On June 4, 2013, the same District Judge who had 
sentenced Thornhill on her 2003, 2007, and 2009 
Convictions conducted a third revocation hearing.  The 
Court recounted in detail Thornhill’s criminal history and 
set forth the alleged violations of the terms of her 
supervised release on the record.  Defense counsel noted 
that Thornhill admitted the allegations in the Sixth 
Petition except for the state law violations and the 
averment that she had failed to report to the probation 
office.  The probation officer noted Thornhill’s 
psychiatric disorders and that she had been traumatized 
                                                 
4
 Section 3583(g) mandates revocation “[i]f the defendant 
. . . as a part of drug testing, tests positive for illegal 
controlled substances more than 3 times over the course 
of 1 year.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4).  Thornhill’s positive 
tests triggered § 3583(g)’s applicability. 
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because she had witnessed her brother’s murder.  In the 
wake of this murder, the probation officer noted, 
Thornhill also had to cope with the murder of one of her 
sons and the fact that another son sustained serious 
injuries in a motor vehicle accident.  The probation 
officer acknowledged that Thornhill’s failure to comply 
with the reporting requirement occurred during this 
turbulent time.   
The Court then heard argument, during which 
defense counsel noted that Thornhill’s violations were 
Grade C violations and urged the Court not to revoke her 
supervised release.  He emphasized the tragic nature of 
Thornhill’s case, acknowledging that the “Court is aware 
of her history.”  Counsel went on to recount Thornhill’s 
psychiatric disorders, her abusive childhood and 
marriage, and the series of tragic events involving the 
murders of her brother and her son, as well as the car 
accident involving her other son.  Counsel conceded that 
Thornhill had tested positive for marijuana, but explained 
that she was self-medicating in light of her 
circumstances.  Counsel urged that, instead of revoking 
her supervised release, the Court should provide her with 
“structure.”   
The Court responded to counsel by stating:  
“That’s what we’ve been trying to give her . . . . She’s 
been here, and been here, and been here.  That’s what the 
whole plan has been.  [The probation officer] has worked 
hard to try to give her a structure.”   
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The judge asked the probation officer whether 
supervised release should be revoked.  The probation 
officer replied that she had tried to work with Thornhill 
by referring her to different programs, but that Thornhill 
had failed both to follow through and to comply with 
directives from the Court.  The probation officer 
expressed her belief that Thornhill “needs the structured 
environment, such as prison.”  The government agreed, 
once again, urging the Court to impose a substantial 
sentence.  The Assistant U.S. Attorney recommended a 
three-year period of imprisonment, consisting of a one-
year term of imprisonment on each conviction.  
The Court concluded that Thornhill had violated 
the conditions of her supervised release.  Thornhill then 
addressed the Court.  She referred to the unexpected 
trauma in her life and stated: 
I’m not asking you for anything, but if you 
want to put me in jail, that’s fine.  The only 
thing I’m asking is, that I’ve always 
reported, I’ve never not showed up for court.  
I’ve never showed you any disrespect to not 
report.  I’m just asking – I wasn’t able to be 
there when my brother’s murderers were 
convicted.  I’m just asking, can I be there 
when the person who shot my child is tried.  
That’s all I’m asking.  If you want to sent 
me away, that’s fine, Your Honor.  But I did 
not come out of prison to disrespect you.  
15 
 
In response to Thornhill’s remarks, the District 
Judge stated the following:  
Whatever you’ve done or not done, Miss 
Thornhill, I personally don’t feel as though 
you’ve disrespected me.  The law is the law, 
and you’ve been here time and again and 
been asked to comply with the law, and do 
what the Probation Office has been 
attempting to help you do.  And although 
you have personal issues, and I recognize 
those, to be honest, you’ve been a very, very 
difficult person to deal with whenever 
you’re not in a controlled environment.  And 
I don’t know whether you’re difficult to deal 
with when you’re in a controlled 
environment, but I’ve had nine years of 
experience with you and it’s been time, after 
time, after time. 
The District Court then found that Thornhill had 
committed Grade C violations, including the positive 
drug tests for marijuana and the failure to participate in 
the various programs designed to address her mental 
health disorders and her substance abuse.  The Court 
explained that the positive drug tests triggered the 
mandatory revocation provision in § 3583(g), which 
required a term of imprisonment.  The Court 
acknowledged an exception to § 3583(g)’s mandatory 
16 
 
revocation.
5
  He concluded, however, that this exception 
was not warranted in Thornhill’s case in light of the 
unsuccessful efforts that had already been made to 
address her substance abuse problems.  The judge 
revoked her supervised release on each conviction, 
noting that she was subject to imprisonment for not more 
than three years on each conviction.
6
  The Court imposed 
a term of imprisonment of twelve months for each 
conviction to be served consecutively, with “no 
supervised release to follow, as you have proven yourself 
to be unmanageable in a free society environment.”  The 
District Court directed that Thornhill begin her 36-month 
sentence immediately.
7
       
                                                 
5
 Section 3583(d) provides that the “Court shall consider 
whether the availability of appropriate substance abuse 
treatment programs, or an individual’s current or past 
participation in such programs, warrants an exception . . . 
from the rule of section 3583(g) when considering any 
action against a defendant who fails a drug test.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3583(d).    
6
 In reviewing the advisory guideline for each conviction, 
the District Court pointed out that the advisory guideline 
range for the 2003 Conviction was three to nine months, 
five to eleven months for the 2007 Conviction, and six to 
twelve months for the 2009 Conviction.  A399. 
7
 Because he had been advised that the trial of her son’s 
murderer was scheduled to commence in a week, the 
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Thornhill filed a timely notice of appeal, 
challenging the revocation of supervised release in each 
of the three criminal proceedings.
8
 
II. 
 Thornhill contends that the sentences the District 
Court imposed upon revocations were procedurally and 
substantively unreasonable.  In particular, Thornhill 
asserts that the District Judge erred by failing to articulate 
his reasons for rejecting the recommended guideline 
range, and by failing to indicate if, or how, he considered 
the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).  In addition, Thornhill submits that the District 
Court failed to respond to her mitigation arguments.  
According to Thornhill, these errors rendered the District 
Court’s sentences substantively unreasonable. 
The government contends that Thornhill’s 
arguments lack merit, arguing that a district court “is not 
required to consider the § 3553(a) factors when 
revocation of supervised release is governed by 
                                                                                                             
judge requested the cooperation of the United States 
Marshal’s Service while Thornhill was in local custody 
in the event she was subpoenaed to appear. 
8
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(g).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
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§ 3583(g).”  For that reason alone, the government 
asserts that Thornhill’s claim of procedural error must 
fail.  Nonetheless, the government submits that the 
District Court did consider some of the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors and that the Court’s revocation order 
is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.  
III.
9
 
A. 
 According to the government, this court has 
determined that once § 3583(g) applies, the District Court 
is not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in 
                                                 
9
 The question of whether the District Court is required to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing a term of 
imprisonment under § 3583(g) presents an issue of law 
subject to plenary review.  See United States v. Smith, 
445 F.3d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting, in the context 
of an appeal challenging a condition of supervised 
release, that our review is plenary to the extent it 
concerns a legal issue); see also United States v. 
Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 570 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying 
plenary review to question of statutory interpretation 
involving § 3583(i)).  We review the procedural and 
substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed upon 
revocation of supervised release for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
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imposing a term of imprisonment.  It relies on our 
decision in United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 772 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  There, we noted the two types of revocation 
proceedings: discretionary revocation under § 3583(e)(3) 
and mandatory revocation under § 3583(g).  Id.  With 
regard to the mandatory provision, we stated that 
“[w]hile [mandatory revocation under] § 3583(g) does 
not expressly require consideration of the § 3553(a) 
factors, it does not prohibit the sentencing court from 
doing so.”  Id.   
Ostensibly, this language lends some support for 
the government’s contention that the District Court did 
not err because it was not required to consider the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  Yet the Doe language is not 
controlling.  Because the Doe Court ultimately concluded 
that the District Court had exercised its authority under 
§ 3583(e)’s discretionary revocation provision, the 
statement relied upon by the government is dictum.  
Furthermore, the Court’s “observation” that § 3583(g) 
does not explicitly refer to the § 3553(a) factors does not 
amount to a holding that these factors have no role to 
play in a mandatory revocation proceeding.
10
  
Accordingly, we are left to decide whether the § 3553(a) 
factors must be considered by a district judge in deciding 
                                                 
10
 Indeed, the government tacitly acknowledges as much.  
In its Rule 28(j) letter, the government characterized this 
quotation from Doe merely as an “observation.” 
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the length of a term of imprisonment following 
mandatory revocation under § 3583(g). 
B. 
In the absence of binding authority, we must 
determine whether the statute provides specific guidance 
to a district judge when exercising his/her discretion in 
choosing an appropriate term of imprisonment following 
mandatory revocation of supervised release.  “Statutory 
interpretation requires that we begin with a careful 
reading of the text.”  Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2013).  See also Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (“As in all 
statutory construction cases, we begin with the language 
of the statute.”).  
Our inquiry is not confined solely to the text of 
§ 3583(g).  Rather, “[i]n matters of statutory 
interpretation, the ‘plain meaning’ of statutory language 
is often illuminated by considering not only ‘the 
particular statutory language’ at issue, but also the 
structure of the section in which the key language is 
found, [and] ‘the design of the statute as a whole and its 
object.’”  United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 
876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Our analysis, therefore, is 
informed not only by the text and structure of § 3583 in 
its entirety, but also the text and structure of the 
Sentencing Reform Act, §§ 3551-3586, which 
established the sentencing regime. 
21 
 
Section 3583 pertains to supervised release.  18 
U.S.C. §  3583.  This section establishes that supervised 
release may be imposed initially as a component of a 
sentence.  Id. § 3583(a).  In addition, once imposed, 
supervised release may be terminated, extended, or 
revoked.  Id. § 3583(e)(1), (2), and (3).  If supervised 
release is revoked and a term of imprisonment is 
imposed, that imprisonment may be followed by another 
term of supervised release.  Id. § 3583(h).     
Revocation of supervised release takes two forms: 
discretionary under § 3583(e) and mandatory under 
§ 3583(g).  Doe, 617 F.3d at 772.  Section 3583(e) 
establishes a three-step process for discretionary 
revocation: (1) a finding by the court that the defendant 
violated a condition of supervised release; (2) a decision 
by the court to revoke the defendant’s term of supervised 
release; and (3) following revocation, the imposition of a 
penalty.
11
  Significantly, subsection (e) directs that  the 
                                                 
11
 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“The court may, after 
considering [certain] factors set forth in § 3553(a) . . . 
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the 
defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of 
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense 
that resulted in such term of supervised release. . . if the 
court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release”). 
22 
 
court’s decision to revoke at step two must be made 
“after considering” certain factors set forth in § 3553(a).  
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).     
Section 3583(g) pertains to mandatory revocation.  
The process set out in this subsection is similar to that of 
§ 3583(e) but eliminates step (2) and makes no reference 
to § 3553(a).  Thus, this subsection entails only two 
steps:  (1) a finding by the court that one of the four 
circumstances in § 3583(g)(1)–(4) occurred; and (2) if so, 
revocation is automatic and the court must impose a 
“term of imprisonment” as a penalty.   
This two-step process makes clear why Congress 
referred in § 3583(e) to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, 
and why it did not need to mention § 3553(a) in the 
mandatory revocation provision in § 3583(g).  Congress 
explicitly tied consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in 
§ 3583(e) to the exercise of discretion by a district court 
in deciding whether to “(1) terminate a term of 
supervised release[,] . . .(2) extend a term of supervised 
release[,] . . . (3) revoke a term of supervised release[,] . . 
. or (4) order the defendant to remain at his place of 
residence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  The mandatory 
revocation provision, however, affords the district court 
no discretion in making a decision about revocation.  
Once § 3583(g) is triggered, the revocation is automatic.  
There was no need, therefore, for Congress to instruct 
that the § 3553(a) factors should be considered prior to 
23 
 
making a decision about mandatory revocation under 
§ 3583(g).   
Moreover, there was no need to refer to § 3553(a) 
in enacting this provision on mandatory revocation.  The 
text of § 3583(g) specifies that when any of the 
enumerated circumstances exist, revocation is mandated 
and a district court “shall . . . require the defendant to 
serve a term of imprisonment.”  The penalty dictated by 
§ 3583(g)–“a term of imprisonment”–is not unique to 
revocation of supervised release under § 3583(g).  It is, 
rather, a common component of most sentences that may 
be imposed following a defendant’s conviction.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3582 (governing the imposition or modification 
of a term of imprisonment); United States v. Goodson, 
544 F.3d 529, 537 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing the penalties 
that may be a component of a sentence).  Section § 3582 
itself provides that a “court, in determining whether to 
impose a term of imprisonment, and . . . in determining 
the length of the term, shall consider the factors set forth 
in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable[.]”  
Id. § 3582(a) (emphasis added).  Thus, the usage of the 
statutory phrase “term of imprisonment” in § 3583(g) 
incorporates both § 3582 and its directive to consider the 
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.   
Section 3553(a)’s applicability to mandatory 
revocation proceedings fits neatly within the sentencing 
regime established by the Sentencing Reform Act.  
Section 3553(a) provides that “in determining the 
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particular sentence to be imposed, [a court] shall 
consider” seven enumerated factors.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1)–(7).  Each of the statutory provisions 
pertaining to the various components of a sentence also 
directs that the § 3553(a) factors should be considered.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3562 (directing that the court, “in 
determining whether to impose a term of probation, and . 
. . the length . . . and conditions of probation, shall 
consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)); § 3572 
(the court, “[i]n determining whether to impose a 
fine . . . shall consider,” inter alia, the § 3553(a) factors); 
§ 3583(c) (inclusion of supervised release as a part of a 
sentence requires consideration of certain § 3553(a) 
factors).  Indeed, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is 
not limited to determining the type of penalty and the 
attributes of that penalty.  Section 3553(a) also applies 
when a court decides whether multiple sentences are to 
run concurrently or consecutively.  18 U.S.C. § 3584(b).   
Nothing in the language of § 3553(a) limits its 
application to a revocation proceeding under § 3583(g).  
Nor does § 3582(a) include language concerning the 
factors to be considered in determining the length of a 
term of imprisonment that renders § 3553(a) inapplicable 
to a mandatory revocation proceeding.  And the 
mandatory revocation provision itself does not prohibit 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in setting the 
length of the term of imprisonment required by the 
statute.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(g); Doe, 617 F.3d at 772.  
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Accordingly, we hold that the text and structure of 
§ 3583 and the Sentencing Reform Act require a district 
court to consider the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) in 
determining the duration of the term of imprisonment 
imposed under the mandatory revocation provision in 
§ 3583(g).
12
 
Our holding should not be unexpected.  It is 
consistent with this court’s jurisprudence concluding that 
the § 3553(a) factors are relevant in revocation 
proceedings.  In United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496 (3d 
Cir. 2013), we considered whether a district court that 
had revoked supervised release under § 3583(e)(3) had 
erred by imposing both a “term of imprisonment” and a 
term of supervised release without conducting separate 
§ 3553(a) analyses for each penalty.  We concluded that a 
single § 3553(a) analysis was sufficient.  In reaching this 
conclusion, we recognized that, in a revocation 
proceeding, § 3583(h) permits a district court to impose a 
term of supervised release to follow any term of 
imprisonment.  Although § 3583(h) does not reference 
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, we held that the 
sentencing factors are to be considered in imposing an 
additional term of supervised release because they are 
“listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), the provision governing 
                                                 
12
 We limit our holding to the factors that must be 
considered when imposing a term of imprisonment 
following mandatory revocation under § 3583(g).   
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the imposition of the initial term of supervised release.”  
Id. at 501. See also United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 594 
F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2010) (reasoning that even though 
§ 3583(h) “does not list the [§ 3553(a)] factors to be 
considered in imposing a term of supervised release as a 
part of a revocation sentence, it is a reasonable inference 
that the factors are the same as those to be considered in 
imposing an initial term of supervised release”); United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542-43 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(concluding, without objection, that our review of an 
appeal of a mandatory revocation order is “for 
reasonableness” and that “to be reasonable the record 
must demonstrate the sentencing court gave meaningful 
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors”). 
Finally, our holding is consistent with the overall 
sentencing scheme of the Sentencing Reform Act, which 
repeatedly tethers the exercise of discretion by a 
sentencing judge to the factors set out in § 3553(a).  It 
would be odd indeed for Congress, after specifying that 
the § 3553(a) factors must inform a district court’s 
exercise of discretion in imposing each component of a 
sentence, see §§ 3553(a), 3562(a), 3572(a), 3582(a), 
3583(c), to then give a district court carte blanche in 
imposing a term of imprisonment following mandatory 
revocation of supervised release under § 3583(g).  See 
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 
(3d Cir. 2012) (observing that the principles of statutory 
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interpretations instruct that courts should “avoid 
constructions that produce odd or absurd results”). 
IV. 
A. 
Having concluded that the District Court was 
obliged to consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding the 
length of the term of imprisonment to impose following 
revocation under § 3583(g), we turn to Thornhill’s 
assertion that the District Court erred procedurally.  In 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 
2006), we established a “three-step sentencing process.”  
After calculating the guideline sentence and formally 
ruling on any motions of the parties, a sentencing court 
must then exercise its discretion by considering the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors in determining an appropriate 
sentence.  Thornhill contends that the District Court erred 
at the third step of this process by failing to: (1) give 
rational and meaningful consideration to the relevant § 
3553(a) factors; (2) adequately explain the sentence, 
including an explanation for any deviation from the 
guidelines; and (3) respond to defense counsel’s 
colorable arguments for mitigation.  The burden is on 
Thornhill to demonstrate that the District Court’s 
sentence is unreasonable.  United States v. Cooper, 437 
F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 
grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 
(2007). 
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We review for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In 
Tomko, we emphasized that “it is essential that district 
courts make an ‘individualized assessment based on the 
facts presented.’”  Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552  
U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).  We instructed that “it is equally 
important that district courts provide courts of appeals 
with an explanation ‘sufficient for us to see that the 
particular circumstances of the case have been given 
meaningful consideration within the parameters of 
§ 3553(a).’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 
F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
“Meaningful consideration” of the § 3553(a) 
factors is also required in revocation proceedings.  In 
Bungar, we declared that in order for the penalty 
imposed upon revocation of supervised release “to be 
reasonable the record must demonstrate that the 
sentencing court gave ‘meaningful consideration’” to the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  478 F.3d at 543.  This does not mean 
that the sentencing court is required to “‘discuss and 
make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the 
record makes clear the court took the factors into account 
in sentencing.’”  Id. (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329).   
The Supreme Court has instructed that the 
“sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the 
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ 
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his 
own legal decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. United 
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States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  And it is, of course, 
the sentencing judge who “has access to, and greater 
familiarity with, the individual case and the individual 
defendant before him than the . . . appeals court.”  Id. at 
357-58.  “Because of the ‘fact-bound nature of each 
sentencing decision,’ there is no ‘uniform threshold’ for 
determining whether a court has supplied a sufficient 
explanation for its sentence.”  United States v. Merced, 
603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Tomko, 562 
F.3d at 567).  In some cases a brief statement will suffice, 
while in others a longer explanation may be necessary.  
Id.  See also Rita, 551 U.S. at 358 (concluding that 
sentencing court’s statement of reasons was “brief”, but 
“legally sufficient”).  What a court may not do, however, 
is ignore a colorable argument raised by a party if it 
concerns the applicability of one the § 3553(a) factors.  
Id.  
When a district judge departs from the guideline 
range, he must “explain his conclusion that an unusually 
lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a 
particular case with sufficient justifications.”  Gall, 552 
U.S. at 46.  Yet we are mindful that “‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances” are not required “to justify a sentence 
outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at 47.  We will not 
regard a sentence as unreasonable simply because we, as 
an appellate panel, might conclude that a different 
sentence would have been appropriate.  Id. at 51.  Rather, 
we must take into account the “extent of the deviation,” 
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and “give due deference to the district court’s decision 
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent 
of the variance.”  Id.   
B. 
The parties’ arguments during the revocation 
proceeding are clear from the record – just as they no 
doubt were to the District Judge.  The defense urged him, 
despite § 3583(g)’s applicability, not to revoke 
Thornhill’s supervised release and not to impose a term 
of imprisonment.  The government argued that the Court 
could not expect any change from Thornhill and it asked 
the Court to impose a three year term of imprisonment 
consisting of a one year term on each conviction, to run 
consecutively.  In other words, the parties were at polar 
extremes:  the defense urged the court to ignore the 
mandates of § 3583(g) while the government advocated a 
sentence of three years. 
The record confirms that the able District Judge 
listened to and understood these arguments.  Thornhill’s 
argument was contrary to the dictates of § 3583(g), and 
the District Court recognized this.  He explained that 
§ 3583(g) required revocation because Thornhill had 
tested positive for marijuana on more than three 
occasions in one year.  Although the defense did not 
explicitly advance the applicability of the exception in 
§ 3583(d) that permits relaxing the mandate of 
imprisonment under § 3583(g), the Court on its own 
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addressed the exception.  That exception was not 
justified, the Court explained, based on Thornhill’s 
failure to attend her current substance abuse and mental 
health programs, as well as her inability to remain drug 
free.  In short, imprisonment was a certainty because of 
§ 3583(g)’s applicability. 
Thornhill argued for mitigation.  Her problems, 
she claimed, were attributable to her having witnessed 
her brother’s murder, and dealing with the emotional 
trauma resulting from both the murder of one of her sons 
and the serious injuries of another.  These circumstances 
were fully considered by the District Court.  The judge 
listened attentively to Thornhill’s allocution.  Thornhill 
explained that she “did not come out of prison to 
disrespect” the Court, but “[t]he unexpected trauma . . . 
was something that happened in my life.”  The District 
Judge directly responded to Thornhill, telling her that he 
“personally” did not “feel as though you’ve disrespected 
me.”  He then acknowledged the “personal issues” 
Thornhill had described and explained to her that the 
“law is the law.”  In addition, at the conclusion of the 
proceeding the Court requested the United States 
Marshal’s Office to keep Thornhill in custody locally in 
the event that she were subpoenaed to appear in the trial 
of her son’s murderer.  Contrary to Thornhill’s argument, 
we conclude that the District Court fully considered and 
responded to defense counsel’s colorable arguments for 
mitigation. 
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The record demonstrates that the District Court 
also meaningfully considered the relevant § 3553(a) 
factors.  Consistent with § 3553(a)(1), the Court fully 
considered the nature and circumstances of the 
violations, together with Thornhill’s history and 
characteristics.  At the beginning of the hearing, the 
Court reviewed its almost-ten-year involvement with 
Thornhill’s criminal cases since 2003.  He noted her 
three convictions for bank fraud and the previous 
revocation proceedings.  He pointed out the substantial 
variance he had granted on the 2007 Conviction and the 
first revocation proceeding, resulting in a sentence to one 
day of imprisonment and an additional period of 
supervised release.  As noted above, the Court knew of 
the personal difficulties Thornhill faced while on 
supervised release.  After hearing arguments from the 
parties, the Court stated that it was “aware of” 
Thornhill’s history and had “considered the extensive 
files in these cases, the presentence reports and addenda 
regarding the initial sentencings, and the Court’s 
previous revocation . . . as well as [her] responses to the 
allegations of the petition and the government’s 
evidence.”  The Court then rendered its findings 
concerning the violations set forth in the Sixth Petition.  
Our review of the record compels our conclusion that the 
Court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(1) was more than 
adequate.  To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the 
District Judge’s statement that “I’ve had nine years of 
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experience with you, and it’s been time, after time, after 
time.”   
Section § 3553(a)(2) directs a sentencing court to 
consider the need for the sentence “to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law,” “to provide just punishment,” to deter further 
criminal conduct, “to protect the public” and to provide 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (D).  Thornhill’s 
recidivism, and the applicability of § 3583(g) requiring 
the imposition of a term of imprisonment, brought these 
§ 3553 considerations to the forefront of this revocation 
hearing.  We are well-satisfied that the Court took these 
factors into account.  
The Court’s dialogue with defense counsel is 
telling.  Defense counsel argued that the Court did not 
have to find a violation and that Thornhill just “need[ed] 
structure.”  The Court replied: “That’s what we’ve been 
trying to give her . . .  She’s been here, and been here, 
and been here. . . . So how else are we going to 
accomplish that, without forcing her into a situation.”  
This exchange clearly reveals the Court’s conclusion that 
mere supervision had been ineffective in curbing 
Thornhill’s substance abuse, deterring her criminal 
conduct, or compelling her compliance with a regimen of 
mental health treatment.  In short, incapacitation and 
deterrence had become necessary.   
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The District Court then asked the probation officer 
for her view.  She expressed her belief that Thornhill 
“would not be compliant” with any program offered 
outside a “lock-down facility.”  She noted that, despite 
her attempts to work with Thornhill, “[e]very step of the 
way . . . she fail[ed] to comply with any directive.”  The 
probation officer agreed that Thornhill “needs the 
structured environment . . . [of] prison.”  Thereafter, the 
Court again signaled the need for incapacitation, stating 
that Thornhill was unmanageable when she was not in a 
controlled environment and that she was “unmanageable 
in a free society environment.”   
As required by § 3553(a)(3) and (4), the District 
Judge addressed the kinds of sentences available and the 
applicable ranges of sentence for the violations with 
respect to each of the convictions.
13
  He also addressed 
                                                 
13
 Section 3553(a)(5) was not applicable to this 
revocation proceeding.  Section § 3553(a)(6) was not 
relevant because there was no need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities in this revocation proceeding.  
Section 3553(a)(7) requires consideration of the “need to 
provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 
Because Thornhill’s failure to pay restitution was a 
violation alleged in the Sixth Petition, this sentencing 
factor was manifestly relevant.  The Court appropriately 
addressed this factor, making a finding that Thornhill had 
not paid any restitution since June 13, 2011.  Thornhill’s 
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the grade of the various violations, pointed out that the 
maximum term of imprisonment on each conviction was 
36 months, and noted the increasing guideline range for 
each conviction in light of the expanded criminal history 
category on the latter two convictions.  And he noted the 
advisory nature of the sentencing ranges.  This discussion 
was sufficient to demonstrate consideration of 
§ 3553(a)(3) and (4).
14
  We therefore reject Thornhill’s 
contention that the District Court failed to adequately 
consider the § 3553(a) factors. 
                                                                                                             
dire financial condition, however, obviated the need to 
further address this factor. 
14
 Section 3553(a)(4)(B) directs a sentencing court to 
consider the applicable policy statements.  The 
commentary to United States Sentencing Guideline 
(U.S.S.G.) § 7B1.4 provides that “[w]here the original 
sentence was the result of a downward departure . . . that 
resulted in a sentence below the guideline range 
applicable to the defendant’s underlying conduct, an 
upward departure may be warranted.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, 
applic. note 4 (2012).  Although the District Court did 
not specifically refer to this policy statement, it is 
nonetheless informative because of the substantial 
downward variance Thornhill received on the 2007 
Conviction.  This variance was an aspect of Thornhill’s 
history, and the Court made specific reference to it.   
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Thornhill maintains that the Court failed to 
adequately explain the sentence that it ultimately decided 
upon.  We acknowledge that the sentencing judge “might 
have said more.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 359.  Rita instructs, 
however, that “context and record” are important in 
determining whether the “sentencing judge considered 
the evidence and arguments.”  Id.  We conclude that the 
record and context make clear that the District Court 
fully considered all of the evidence and the arguments of 
the parties.  For that reason, we are hard-pressed to find 
that the District Court’s order was procedurally 
unreasonable or that it constituted an abuse of discretion.  
At the time of this revocation proceeding, the judge had 
nearly a decade of experience with Thornhill.  He had 
demonstrated leniency in his efforts to help her.  After 
advising the parties that he was fully aware of Thornhill’s 
history and her characteristics and that he had reviewed 
her extensive files, the District Judge emphasized the 
need for structure in the sentence he must impose.  
Thornhill’s violations were not a breach of trust on a 
single conviction.  The Court was fully aware that it was 
imposing three separate penalties on three separate 
convictions.  His words adequately conveyed that a 
lengthy term of imprisonment was called for under § 
3583(g) because his more lenient exercises of discretion 
had neither deterred Thornhill from criminal conduct nor 
adequately conveyed to her the serious nature of her 
circumstances.   
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In sum, we conclude that the District Court’s order 
revoking Thornhill’s terms of supervised release and 
imposing three separate penalties was not procedurally 
unreasonable. 
C. 
Thornhill also challenges the substantive 
reasonableness of her sentence.  In her view, the District 
Court’s procedural errors rendered her sentence 
substantively unreasonable.  Because we have concluded 
that the District Court did not err procedurally, we 
conclude that there is no merit to her substantive 
challenge.  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (instructing that 
“if the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we 
will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on the particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided”).   
IV. 
In sum, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Rita that “[t]he sentencing judge has 
access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case 
and the individual defendant before him than the 
Commission or the appeals court.”  551 U.S. at 357-58.  
That is especially so in this case, where the District Court 
had followed closely over time Thornhill’s repeated 
violations of her supervised release.  Given the District 
Judge’s experience with Thornhill and what we consider 
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to have been his measured treatment of her violations, we 
conclude that the sentences should not be disturbed.  
We will affirm. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part and Dissenting 
in part: 
 
 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court was 
required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) in sentencing Ms. Thornhill, and I readily join their 
eloquent and well-reasoned opinion on that issue. 
 
 I part ways with the majority’s disposition, however, 
because I would remand so that the District Court can 
meaningfully consider those sentencing factors in connection 
with the mandatory imprisonment of Ms. Thornhill upon 
revocation of her supervised release.  The length of her term 
of imprisonment is squarely at issue, and the § 3553(a) factors 
should be weighed.  This is especially true because the 
District Court varied upward in giving Ms. Thornhill a 
sentence of three years.   
 
Until today, we have never addressed whether the § 
3553(a) sentencing factors must be considered in the context 
of mandatory revocation of supervised release, under 
§ 3583(g), and, indeed, few other Courts of Appeals have 
discussed this issue at length.  If anything, as the Government 
points out, our case law previously hinted that consideration 
of the factors was appropriate, but not required, in this 
context.  See United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 
2010).  However, today we clearly hold for the first time that 
 2 
 
such consideration is mandatory.  The majority finds that the 
District Court anticipated this holding and meaningfully 
considered the sentencing factors under § 3553(a).   
 
In the usual case, we might debate whether the 
scattered statements of a district court resemble a discussion 
of the pertinent sentencing factors.  However, here, the 
District Court had no inkling that an analysis of the § 3553(a) 
factors was required, and as a consequence, never mentioned 
the factors once.
1
  This was through no fault of the District 
Court, conducted as it was by a “judge [and] not a prophet,” 
lacking any reason to anticipate the requirement we set out 
today.  See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 527 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  But fairness dictates that when we announce a 
new rule that could impact the length of the sentence imposed 
a remand for resentencing is appropriate.  See id. (remanding 
for resentencing where a district court, “[l]acking . . . 
clairvoyance,” failed to anticipate requirement to consider 
§ 3553(a) factors post-Booker); United States v. Manzella, 
475 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (remanding for resentencing 
upon holding that prison sentences could not be imposed for 
rehabilitative purposes).   
 
We need only review the record briefly to determine 
that the District Court did not, in fact, foresee our holding and 
meaningfully consider the § 3553(a) factors.  The District 
Court provided no explanation for its three-year, above-
guidelines sentence, beyond the bare statement that Ms. 
Thornhill had “proven [her]self to be unmanageable in a free 
                                              
1
 “§ 3553(a)” appears only once in the transcript, in Ms. 
Thornhill’s objection at the conclusion of sentencing.  (App. 
402.) 
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society environment.”  (App. 400.)2  A defendant’s 
“manageability,” whatever that might mean, is not included 
among the sentencing considerations listed under § 3553(a).  
Thus, the sole explanation provided by the District Court does 
not show rational and meaningful consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors.
3
  This alone necessitates a remand for 
resentencing. 
 
 Likewise, the District Court’s other asides and 
statements in the sentencing hearing do not reveal why Ms. 
Thornhill was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, let 
alone indicate that the sentence was based on the § 3553(a) 
                                              
2
 Though this was the sole explanation provided upon the 
imposition of sentence, the majority makes only a passing 
reference to it, noting that the comment “signaled the need for 
incapacitation . . . .” (Majority Op. at 34.)  The remainder of 
the statements cited by the majority were made at different 
points in the hearing, some during testimony, others during 
argument, and all well before sentence was imposed, such 
that there is no indication which, if any of them, factored into 
the District Court’s decision to sentence Ms. Thornhill above 
the guidelines.  
3
 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007), cited by the 
majority for the proposition that the “context and the record” 
can support the sentence here, is inapposite.  That case 
concerned a within-guidelines sentence, and the Supreme 
Court found that a specific explanation was not required in 
such a “conceptually simple” case.  Id. at 359.  By contrast, 
the Court noted, “[w]here the judge imposes a sentence 
outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has 
done so.” Id. at 357.  The sentence here was above the 
guidelines, and no explanation was given.   
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factors.  For example, the Court’s most detailed comment 
was, in full, as follows:  
 
The Court: That’s what we’ve been trying to give her 
[defense counsel].  She’s been here, and been here, and 
been here.  That’s what the whole plan has been.  [The 
probation officer] has worked hard to try to give her a 
structure, and give her psychiatric treatment, the 
mental health treatment, the drug counseling.  I mean, 
that’s what we have been doing.  So, how else are we 
going to accomplish that, without forcing her into a 
situation where she has to do what she has to do? 
 
(App. 384.)  The majority cites part of this remark as 
evidence of the Court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(2), 
involving incapacitation and deterrence.  (Majority Op. at 33.)  
But far from addressing any of the sentencing factors, the 
Court was asking how else it was going to give Ms. Thornhill 
“a structure, and give her psychiatric treatment, the mental 
health treatment, the drug counseling,” except through prison 
time.  (App. 384.)  Thus, we cannot know if the Court may 
have impermissibly lengthened Ms. Thornhill’s prison term to 
promote rehabilitation.
4
   I find that this comment does not 
represent meaningful consideration of a sentencing factor, but 
                                              
4
 That is, the District Court potentially violated the holding of 
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011): “a court 
may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an 
offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to 
promote rehabilitation.”  Several Courts of Appeals have 
found this holding to extend to sentences imposed upon 
revocation of supervised release.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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rather evidences a troubling ambiguity that should be cleared 
up by a remand for resentencing. 
 
 More generally, where a defendant is sentenced 
without the slightest indication that the § 3553(a) factors were 
considered, our case law dictates a remand.  In United States 
v. Clark, cited by the majority, we held that consideration of 
the § 3553(a) factors had been inadequate for a within-
guidelines sentence, even though the district court 
acknowledged that it had to consider them and even provided 
a “full discussion of the first relevant factor.”  726 F.3d 496, 
503 (3d Cir. 2013).  We held the subsequent “rote recitation 
of the relevant factors . . . cannot support a conclusion that the 
record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).  Nor can we determine, from the record before us, 
that the court reasonably applied those factors to the 
circumstance of the case.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, we remanded for resentencing. 
 
  Unlike Clark, the term of imprisonment in this case is 
above the guidelines range.  And unlike Clark, the District 
Court here did not discuss any of the sentencing factors, or 
even list them in a rote manner.  See also United States v. 
Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (remanding for 
resentencing where, inter alia, “the District Court did not 
mention § 3553(a) when it imposed its sentence, or the 
necessity of applying the § 3553(a) factors under our case 
law”).  Nor did the Court ever refer to the substance of the 
factors, such as: the need to provide just punishment, 
adequate deterrence and protection of the public, as well as 
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.  In sum, 
the record provides no basis to conclude that the District 
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Court anticipated our decision today and meaningfully 
considered the § 3553(a) factors.  Indeed, it would be 
surprising if the record revealed otherwise. 
 
  We simply cannot know how meaningful 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, which we now require, 
would have affected Ms. Thornhill’s sentence.  Speculation 
on our part as to what the Court might have been considering, 
and whether those reasons coincide with § 3553(a), cannot be 
enough to uphold Ms. Thornhill’s above-guidelines sentence.  
In short, Ms. Thornhill deserves to have the rule announced 
today applied to her case.  I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s disposition.   
 
